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	<title>Comments on: Neelie Kroes on the Goals of Antitrust Intervention in Standards-based Industries</title>
	<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1389</link>
	<description>News and commentary about antitrust, economics, technology, policy</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 17:12:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Hanno Kaiser</title>
		<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1389#comment-14828</link>
		<author>Hanno Kaiser</author>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2008 22:06:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1389#comment-14828</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Suppose you introduce a great product in an industry with direct network effects. Customers love it, and at some point the market tips and your product becomes the de facto standard. In this scenario, the de facto standard is the result of a competitive market. Nevertheless, your newly found dominant position triggers the "special obligations" under Art. 82. If you don't live up to those obligations, "the competition authority has to recreate the conditions of competition that would have emerged from a properly carried out standardisation process." What are those conditions? Probably FRAND licensing commitments as they would have been negotiated at a time when there were still technological choices and your market power had not yet been amplified by widespread standards adoption. Thus I don't think I am misreading her statement: De facto standards are to be evaluated against a benchmark of a hypothetical, ideal SSO situation.&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Suppose you introduce a great product in an industry with direct network effects. Customers love it, and at some point the market tips and your product becomes the de facto standard. In this scenario, the de facto standard is the result of a competitive market. Nevertheless, your newly found dominant position triggers the &#8220;special obligations&#8221; under Art. 82. If you don&#8217;t live up to those obligations, &#8220;the competition authority has to recreate the conditions of competition that would have emerged from a properly carried out standardisation process.&#8221; What are those conditions? Probably FRAND licensing commitments as they would have been negotiated at a time when there were still technological choices and your market power had not yet been amplified by widespread standards adoption. Thus I don&#8217;t think I am misreading her statement: De facto standards are to be evaluated against a benchmark of a hypothetical, ideal SSO situation.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Norm</title>
		<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1389#comment-14821</link>
		<author>Norm</author>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2008 23:22:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1389#comment-14821</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;I think you miss the point. We should unconditionally accept market results only from competitive markets. In all other cases, as Neelie Kroes correctly points out, we should do what we can to achieve the same result that a competitive market would have. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Competitive marketplaces protect consumers. Non-competitive marketplaces serve other interests at the expense of consumers.&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think you miss the point. We should unconditionally accept market results only from competitive markets. In all other cases, as Neelie Kroes correctly points out, we should do what we can to achieve the same result that a competitive market would have. </p>

<p>Competitive marketplaces protect consumers. Non-competitive marketplaces serve other interests at the expense of consumers.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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