Comments on: Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law (Cheat Sheet) http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170 News and commentary about antitrust, economics, technology, policy Mon, 13 Oct 2008 07:38:49 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2 By: Antitrust Review » Exclusionary Conduct and the Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-717 Antitrust Review » Exclusionary Conduct and the Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law Mon, 20 Feb 2006 18:21:47 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-717 <p>[...] Most of the recent cases dealing with the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws have arisen in the context of cartel overcharges. In other words, some price fixing conduct somewhere has led to supra-competitive prices, that is, overcharges, paid by someone else. In a previous post, I suggested a simplified framework for analyzing these cases. The central idea was that it is highly misleading to discuss competitive effects from the collusive conduct as somehow divorced from the injury suffered by the plaintiff. The overcharge is the injury, and the injury is the relevant effect. Consequently, an effect is a “domestic effect,” if and only if there is a US person that was overcharged. To drive that point home, the chart in my previous post followed the flow of cash as opposed to the flow of goods. Some readers found that confusing, so here is a version that tracks the flow of goods. Note that the red jagged circles (”++$”) indicate the geographic locus of the injury/effect. [...]</p> […] Most of the recent cases dealing with the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws have arisen in the context of cartel overcharges. In other words, some price fixing conduct somewhere has led to supra-competitive prices, that is, overcharges, paid by someone else. In a previous post, I suggested a simplified framework for analyzing these cases. The central idea was that it is highly misleading to discuss competitive effects from the collusive conduct as somehow divorced from the injury suffered by the plaintiff. The overcharge is the injury, and the injury is the relevant effect. Consequently, an effect is a “domestic effect,” if and only if there is a US person that was overcharged. To drive that point home, the chart in my previous post followed the flow of cash as opposed to the flow of goods. Some readers found that confusing, so here is a version that tracks the flow of goods. Note that the red jagged circles (”++$”) indicate the geographic locus of the injury/effect. […]

]]> By: Adam Smith, Esq. http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-649 Adam Smith, Esq. Sun, 08 Jan 2006 22:19:10 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-649 <p><strong>Blawg Review #39</strong></p> <p>"Adam Smith, Esq." is honored and delighted to host Blawg Review #39; I consider myself in excellent company given the distinguished and talented people who have hosted Blawg Review in the past.   This week we celebrate: Epiphany:&...</p> Blawg Review #39

"Adam Smith, Esq." is honored and delighted to host Blawg Review #39; I consider myself in excellent company given the distinguished and talented people who have hosted Blawg Review in the past.   This week we celebrate: Epiphany:&…

]]> By: (Anti) Trust Me http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-648 (Anti) Trust Me Sun, 08 Jan 2006 17:20:49 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/170#comment-648 <p><strong>Over Here Over There</strong></p> <p>There is a new post on the Law Society weblog containing a cheat sheet on the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws.</p> Over Here Over There

There is a new post on the Law Society weblog containing a cheat sheet on the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws.

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