http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175 News and commentary about antitrust, economics, technology, policy Thu, 20 Nov 2008 12:31:58 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-718 Antitrust Review » Exclusionary Conduct and the Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law Mon, 20 Feb 2006 18:24:23 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-718 <p>[...] This is the Empagran (2004) situation, which is a combination of (3) and (2). As a result of A’s and B’s foreign price fixing, D, a foreign buyer, pays inflated prices. But D is not the only one harmed by the cartel. C, a domestic buyer, also pays inflated prices. In that situation, does D have standing to sue in the US for its (foreign) harm? The answer to this question is still subject to controversy, but a conservative answer is: “Yes, provided that harm to C (= domestic harm) is the proximate cause of D’s (foreign) harm.” (But not vice versa.) [...]</p> […] This is the Empagran (2004) situation, which is a combination of (3) and (2). As a result of A’s and B’s foreign price fixing, D, a foreign buyer, pays inflated prices. But D is not the only one harmed by the cartel. C, a domestic buyer, also pays inflated prices. In that situation, does D have standing to sue in the US for its (foreign) harm? The answer to this question is still subject to controversy, but a conservative answer is: “Yes, provided that harm to C (= domestic harm) is the proximate cause of D’s (foreign) harm.” (But not vice versa.) […]

]]> http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-686 Antitrust Review » Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law (Cheat Sheet) Sat, 04 Feb 2006 18:19:04 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-686 <p>[...] This is the Empagran (2004) situation, which is a combination of (3) and (2). As a result of A’s and B’s foreign price fixing, D, a foreign buyer, pays inflated prices. But D is not the only one harmed by the cartel. C, a domestic buyer, also pays inflated prices. In that situation, does D have standing to sue in the US for its (foreign) harm? The answer to this question is still subject to controversy, but a conservative answer is: “Yes, provided that harm to C (= domestic harm) is the proximate cause of D’s (foreign) harm.” (But not vice versa.) [...]</p> […] This is the Empagran (2004) situation, which is a combination of (3) and (2). As a result of A’s and B’s foreign price fixing, D, a foreign buyer, pays inflated prices. But D is not the only one harmed by the cartel. C, a domestic buyer, also pays inflated prices. In that situation, does D have standing to sue in the US for its (foreign) harm? The answer to this question is still subject to controversy, but a conservative answer is: “Yes, provided that harm to C (= domestic harm) is the proximate cause of D’s (foreign) harm.” (But not vice versa.) […]

]]> http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-672 Antitrust Review » Empagran Roundup Sat, 21 Jan 2006 21:27:55 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-672 <p>[...] Discussion of the D.C. Circuits Empagran II decision. [...]</p> […] Discussion of the D.C. Circuits Empagran II decision. […]

]]> http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-667 Anonymous Fri, 20 Jan 2006 21:03:00 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/175#comment-667 <p>Could you please re-post the cheatsheet. It does not appear to be available on your blog anymore. It was quite helpful. Thanks very much.</p> Could you please re-post the cheatsheet. It does not appear to be available on your blog anymore. It was quite helpful. Thanks very much.

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