Comments on: An Attempt at Defining the Core Concepts of Antitrust http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311 News and commentary about antitrust, economics, technology, policy Mon, 15 Feb 2010 15:26:52 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Antitrust Review » Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust Law; Follow-up http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311/comment-page-1#comment-736 Antitrust Review » Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust Law; Follow-up Mon, 27 Feb 2006 20:53:32 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311#comment-736 <p>[...] Following up on my previous posts about the conceptual foundations of antitrust law (here and here), the chart below illustrates the relationship between the ultimate goal of economic policy (consumer welfare), the primary means of achieving it (free markets, competition), and the mission of the antitrust laws (prohibiting conduct having significant anticompetitive effects) as a policy tool for promoting competition and therefore consumer welfare. Moreover, the chart depicts the two most important proxies for anticompetitive conduct, market power (the ability and the incentive to raise prices) and market concentration (e.g., HHI measures), as well as the evidence typically introduced in proving anticompetitive effects directly or circumstantially by establishing the factual predicates for one of the two proxies. Against this backdrop, it is apparent that much of the traditional merger analysis involves the least direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. Delineating markets, identifying market participants, and computing market shares all contribute to establishing a market concentration measure. That measure, in turn, permits the inference of market power (Step 1). Market power permits the inference of anticompetitive effects (Step 2). The diminution of competition, finally, permits the inference of a consumer welfare loss (Step 3).Technorati Tags: antitrust, inference, competitive effects, consumer welfare, economic policy You can also bookmark this on del.icio.us or check the cosmos [...]</p> [...] Following up on my previous posts about the conceptual foundations of antitrust law (here and here), the chart below illustrates the relationship between the ultimate goal of economic policy (consumer welfare), the primary means of achieving it (free markets, competition), and the mission of the antitrust laws (prohibiting conduct having significant anticompetitive effects) as a policy tool for promoting competition and therefore consumer welfare. Moreover, the chart depicts the two most important proxies for anticompetitive conduct, market power (the ability and the incentive to raise prices) and market concentration (e.g., HHI measures), as well as the evidence typically introduced in proving anticompetitive effects directly or circumstantially by establishing the factual predicates for one of the two proxies. Against this backdrop, it is apparent that much of the traditional merger analysis involves the least direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. Delineating markets, identifying market participants, and computing market shares all contribute to establishing a market concentration measure. That measure, in turn, permits the inference of market power (Step 1). Market power permits the inference of anticompetitive effects (Step 2). The diminution of competition, finally, permits the inference of a consumer welfare loss (Step 3).Technorati Tags: antitrust, inference, competitive effects, consumer welfare, economic policy You can also bookmark this on del.icio.us or check the cosmos [...]

]]> By: Antitrust Review » Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust Law http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311/comment-page-1#comment-733 Antitrust Review » Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust Law Sat, 25 Feb 2006 22:25:52 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311#comment-733 <p>[...] In a previous post, I tried to outline the core concepts of antitrust law as it is practiced today. This post attempts to reconstruct some of the foundations on which the concepts of antitrust law discussed in that post are built. [...]</p> [...] In a previous post, I tried to outline the core concepts of antitrust law as it is practiced today. This post attempts to reconstruct some of the foundations on which the concepts of antitrust law discussed in that post are built. [...]

]]> By: Hanno Kaiser http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311/comment-page-1#comment-732 Hanno Kaiser Fri, 24 Feb 2006 21:09:10 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311#comment-732 <p>I don't disagree with Glendon's comment. My outline was meant to capture the salient features of antitrust law as it is applied today before the agencies and in court. (I added a clarification to the first sentence of the post to that effect.) For better or worse, non-efficiency goals such as decentralization, political rights, quality of life, diversity, and protectionism have played an increasinly less significant role in antitrust enforcement in the last 30 years. This is not to say that at some point in the future the pendulum won't swing back. And if that day comes, legislative history and pre-Sylvania case law will provide fertile ground for a more populist reading of the antitrust laws. To be sure, <em>efficiency</em> was not foremost on Senator Sherman's mind when he introduced the bill. But alas, even Supreme Court justices who profess to feel bound by "original intent," which is a truly silly notion, tend to apply the concept - shall we say - "selectively."</p> I don’t disagree with Glendon’s comment. My outline was meant to capture the salient features of antitrust law as it is applied today before the agencies and in court. (I added a clarification to the first sentence of the post to that effect.) For better or worse, non-efficiency goals such as decentralization, political rights, quality of life, diversity, and protectionism have played an increasinly less significant role in antitrust enforcement in the last 30 years. This is not to say that at some point in the future the pendulum won’t swing back. And if that day comes, legislative history and pre-Sylvania case law will provide fertile ground for a more populist reading of the antitrust laws. To be sure, efficiency was not foremost on Senator Sherman’s mind when he introduced the bill. But alas, even Supreme Court justices who profess to feel bound by “original intent,” which is a truly silly notion, tend to apply the concept – shall we say – “selectively.”

]]> By: Glendon Irving http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311/comment-page-1#comment-731 Glendon Irving Fri, 24 Feb 2006 20:49:52 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311#comment-731 <p>This definition of antitrust completely ignores pre-1970s antitrust thinking expressed in both case law and legislative history. Historically antitrust has also served to protect the right of competitors to get access to markets, to protect political values, etc.</p> <p>I realize that since the late 1970s, antitrust has been dominated by neo-classical economics, but a broader and historically more accurate definition would be that "antitrust is concerned with the creation and excerise of economic power to the detriment of society as a whole." </p> <p>If antitrust is nothing more than the Wal-Mart of law (always low prices), I sincerely doubt that Congress would have adopted the Sherman Act in 1890, a period of time characterized by the deflation.</p> This definition of antitrust completely ignores pre-1970s antitrust thinking expressed in both case law and legislative history. Historically antitrust has also served to protect the right of competitors to get access to markets, to protect political values, etc.

I realize that since the late 1970s, antitrust has been dominated by neo-classical economics, but a broader and historically more accurate definition would be that “antitrust is concerned with the creation and excerise of economic power to the detriment of society as a whole.”

If antitrust is nothing more than the Wal-Mart of law (always low prices), I sincerely doubt that Congress would have adopted the Sherman Act in 1890, a period of time characterized by the deflation.

]]> By: Antitrust Review » More on Mixed Bundling and Cross Subsidies http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311/comment-page-1#comment-730 Antitrust Review » More on Mixed Bundling and Cross Subsidies Thu, 23 Feb 2006 22:15:56 +0000 http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/311#comment-730 <p>[...] There is more to the story, I think, and I’m not quite ready to give up the argument. A big part of the problem in antitrust is that we need not only to decide what conduct is anticompetitive, but also what conduct can be defined legally so that antitrust enforcement does not sweep up competitive conduct. [...]</p> [...] There is more to the story, I think, and I’m not quite ready to give up the argument. A big part of the problem in antitrust is that we need not only to decide what conduct is anticompetitive, but also what conduct can be defined legally so that antitrust enforcement does not sweep up competitive conduct. [...]

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