After Empagran: Sniado v. Bank Austria (2004)
The Sniado case began with the suicide of Gerhard Praschak, the head of the (state owned) Austrian Kontrollbank in April 1997. In a suicide note, he confessed “that Austria’s banking system was rife with price-fixing of exchange rate fees for Euro-currencies.” Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 352 F.3d 73, 75-76 (2d. Cir. 2003). According to the European Commission, the “Lombard Club,” as the cartel was called by the CEO’s of the participating banks who met every month at the Hotel Bristol in Vienna,
covered the entire Austrian territory ‘down to the smallest village’, … with a view to fixing deposit, lending and other rates to the detriment of businesses and consumers in Austria.John Sniado, a New York resident and frequent traveler to Europe, brought a complaint on behalf of all U.S. persons who had paid inflated foreign exchange fees. The defendants were European banks headquartered in Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. Specifically, Sniado alleged that (i) while in Europe, he paid inflated exchange fees to the defendants; and (ii) that others had been charged inflated exchanges fees both in Europe and in the U.S.
The case was a roller-coaster ride through the federal court system. First, Sniado lost in the Southern District of New York, where the court dismissed his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 174 F. Supp. 2d. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). On appeal, the Second Circuit sided with Snaido, based on its recent decision in Kruman v. Christie’s (2002), where the court had endorsed a broad view of ڌa(1) and (2) of the FTAIA. Kruman, however, following on the heels of the 5th Circuit’s decision in Den Norske v. HeereMac (2001), led to the circuit split that in June 2004 prompted the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran. In Empagran, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the Second Circuit’s broad view. Thus, when Sniado petitioned for review by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, just seven days after its Empagran decision, sent the case back to the Second Circuit “for further consideration in light of [Empagran].” Bank Austria AG v. Sniado, 124 S.Ct. 2870. Less than two months later, in August 2004, the Second Circuit decided Sniado’s case on remand. Sniado lost, and the matter had come full-circle.
Based on the pleadings and the standard set out in Empagran, the Second Circuit’s decision is hardly surprising. Snidao suffered foreign harm, when he paid inflated exchange fees in Europe. Others suffered domestic harm, when they paid inflated exchange fees in the U.S. There are two ways in which a plaintiff can meet the requirement that domestic harm give rise to his or her claims: (i) the plaintiff, in addition to having suffered foreign harm, also suffered domestic harm; and (ii) the domestic harm (to others) caused the plaintiff’s foreign harm (i.e., foreign harm is dependent on domestic harm). Neither alternative was available to Sniado. He hadn’t exchanged money in the U.S. and thus did not suffer direct domestic injury. And he did not allege sufficient facts upon which the court could have found that higher rates in the U.S. had somehow caused (or “helped to bring about”) higher rates in Europe.









December 18th, 2005 at 3:29 pm
[...] [Antitrust] In order to bring a claim for treble damages in U.S. courts, a foreign plaintiff, having suffered antitrust injury abroad (for example, higher prices from a cartel), must show, among other things, that the defendant’s conduct had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce, ??6a(1) FTAIA, and that “the domestic effect gave rise to, that is, caused, the plaintiff’s claim,” ??6a(2) FTAIA. If nothing else, that much can be derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran. Since Empagran, a number of related cases have reached the lower courts, Sniado v. Bank Austria, MM Global Services v. The Dow Chemical Company, and In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation. Each of these cases takes a slightly different look at the the causal relationship between domestic harm and foreign harm that is required by ??6a(2) FTAIA. The chart below illustrates four variants of that relationship: [...]
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January 25th, 2006 at 2:49 pm
[...] Discussion of Sniado v. Bank Austria (2004) [...]
September 16th, 2006 at 1:30 pm
[...] While there are good arguments for interest rate uniformity being driven by the market, I am not so sure about risk premiums, extension premiums, credit allocation fees, and — in particular — management fees. Why would we expect uniformity with respect to elements of price that are not directly related to common costs of capital? There were a number of serious cartel prosecutions in Europe on charges that don’t seem to be all that different. I am thinking of the “Lombard Club” in Austria, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.Technorati Tags: antitrust, israel, banks, interest rates You can also bookmark this on del.icio.us or check the cosmos [...]