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	<title>Comments on: After Empagran: A Survey of Recent Cases</title>
	<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67</link>
	<description>News and commentary about antitrust, economics, technology, policy</description>
	<pubDate>Sat, 06 Sep 2008 21:49:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Antitrust Review &#187; Ignoring the Pink Elephant in the Room: Extraterritoriality and Proximate Cause in the MSG Antitrust Litigation</title>
		<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-765</link>
		<author>Antitrust Review &#187; Ignoring the Pink Elephant in the Room: Extraterritoriality and Proximate Cause in the MSG Antitrust Litigation</author>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:53:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-765</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;[...] The In re MSG litigation is similar in may ways to the real-world fact pattern in Empagran. (See this post for some additional context.) Here as there the issue is whether foreign plaintiffs, having bought cartelized goods (here: MSG) at inflated prices from foreign sellers, can sue for damages in the US. Here as there, the cartel agreement harmed both foreign and US customers. Here as there the harm to the foreign plaintiffs (higher prices abroad) depended economically on domestic harm (higher prices for US buyers). [...]&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] The In re MSG litigation is similar in may ways to the real-world fact pattern in Empagran. (See this post for some additional context.) Here as there the issue is whether foreign plaintiffs, having bought cartelized goods (here: MSG) at inflated prices from foreign sellers, can sue for damages in the US. Here as there, the cartel agreement harmed both foreign and US customers. Here as there the harm to the foreign plaintiffs (higher prices abroad) depended economically on domestic harm (higher prices for US buyers). [&#8230;]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Antitrust Review &#187; Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law (Cheat Sheet)</title>
		<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-685</link>
		<author>Antitrust Review &#187; Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law (Cheat Sheet)</author>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Feb 2006 18:17:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-685</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;[...] While many details of the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws are still very much subject to debate, the basics are relatively straightforward, if one strips away a number of potentially confusing concepts. Since Alcoa (1945), the most important jurisdictional trigger is the effect of the anticompetitive conduct on US commerce. In price fixing cases, the effect is identical to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. In other words, the overcharge (= harm) is the price effect. Why is that important? Because the harm is geographically tied to the customer, i.e., wherever the customer is located at the time of the purchase, that&#8217;s where the harm and the anticompetitive effect occur. Thus, it is misleading to analyze a foreign cartel problem as follows: The conspiracy had price effects both in the US and in Germany, i.e., prices were inflated in both territories. I understand that customer C, based in the US, can recover for goods that he purchased in the US. But can he also recover for goods that he ordered from Germany? [...]&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] While many details of the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust laws are still very much subject to debate, the basics are relatively straightforward, if one strips away a number of potentially confusing concepts. Since Alcoa (1945), the most important jurisdictional trigger is the effect of the anticompetitive conduct on US commerce. In price fixing cases, the effect is identical to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. In other words, the overcharge (= harm) is the price effect. Why is that important? Because the harm is geographically tied to the customer, i.e., wherever the customer is located at the time of the purchase, that&#8217;s where the harm and the anticompetitive effect occur. Thus, it is misleading to analyze a foreign cartel problem as follows: The conspiracy had price effects both in the US and in Germany, i.e., prices were inflated in both territories. I understand that customer C, based in the US, can recover for goods that he purchased in the US. But can he also recover for goods that he ordered from Germany? [&#8230;]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Antitrust Review &#187; Empagran Roundup</title>
		<link>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-675</link>
		<author>Antitrust Review &#187; Empagran Roundup</author>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2006 22:30:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/67#comment-675</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;[...] This survey puts the cases above in context. [...]&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] This survey puts the cases above in context. [&#8230;]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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