The development of the structural presumption after Philadelphia National Bank (1963) and the last major Supreme Court merger decision in General Dynamics (1974) is one of the more fascinating chapters in antitrust jurisprudence. There is probably no other area of the law where lower courts have departed from Supreme Court jurisprudence more radically over a period of about 30 years, without intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress. The tension between the body of modern (post 1975, or, more specifically, post 1982) lower court merger jurisprudence and the (1962-1975) Supreme Court merger jurisprudence gives many antitrust opinions its distinctive flavor in the form of extremely selective quotations. I am still amazed by then judge Thomas’ statement in U.S. v. Baker Hughes (1990) that
The Supreme Court has a adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the statute [§7 of the Clayton Act], weighing a variety or factors to determine the effects of particular transactions on competition.
You don’t have to be a particularly literal reader of precendent to realize that
nothing of that sort can be found in any of the Supreme Court
merger cases. Of course, the Supreme Court has embraced more modern economic teachings in
Sylvania,
BMI, and
Kodak, among others, but still, that’s a long way from a “totality of the circumstances” approach to §7 of the Clayton Act. Here are the
.pdf slides of our last class on the modifications of the structural presumption after
PNB.
Technorati Tags: Philadelphia National Bank, Supreme Court, General Dynamics, antitrust, cardozo
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